Verified Voting Hearings in Richmond: "Virginia Verified Voting has sent out an alert about an upcoming meeting of the 'Joint Subcommittee Studying the Voting Equipment Certification Process' on Tuesday, July 19.  VaVV lists the subcommittee members here.  Their alert reads:

Virginia is holding hearings to consider requiring voter-verified paper audit trails for voting equipment. Many Virginia jurisdictions have purchased paperless electronic voting machines, and others are considering doing so.

Digital voting machines that lack a voter-verified paper trail are subject to programming errors and possible fraud, with no ability for meaningful audits or recounts."

Now, let's remember something from Schneier on Security:

Two programmers can become a lone programmer, says Hursti, who has figured out a way to control the entire central tabulator by way of a single memory card swap, and also how to make tampered polling place tapes match tampered central tabulator results. This more complex approach is untested, but based on testing performed May 26, Hursti says he has absolutely no reason to believe it wouldn't work.

Three memory card tests demonstrated successful manipulation of election results, and showed that 1990 and 2002 FEC-required safeguards are being violated in the Diebold version 1.94 opti-scan system.

Emphasis mine.

(Via Democracy for Virginia.)